Egalitarian allocation principles

This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of fair allocation rules and their properties by studying egalitarian principles in models for allocation problems. The first part builds upon the foundations of bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility. There, claimants have individual utility claims on an estate which is expressed in a set of attainable utility allocations. Bankruptcy rules prescribe for any bankruptcy problem an efficient and feasible payoff allocation. An egalitarian alternative for the proportional rule in this context is the constrained relative equal awards rule, which allocates payoffs as relatively equal as possible provided that no claimants are allocated more than their claims. The second part focusses on the incorporation of egalitarianism in cooperative games. There, players collectively gain revenues while taking into account the possibility to act in coalitions. An egalitarian negotiation procedure models how players iteratively take their coalitional egalitarian opportunities into consideration. A new and general solution concept based on the result of this procedure can be considered as a trade-off between egalitarianism and coalitional rationality. The third part of this dissertation is devoted to communication situations which arise when the players of a cooperative game are subject to cooperation restrictions as modeled by an undirected graph. This part analyzes the decomposition of network communication games into unanimity games and introduces a general class of network control values