In this article, two case studies of large-scale bid rigging in the construction industry in Canada and the Netherlands are analysed to explore why business cartels sometimes do and sometimes do not involve organised crime. By combining concepts from both organised crime and organisational crime, an integrated understanding of the organisation of serious crimes for gain is applied. Across time and space, businesses in the construction industry are known to fix prices, use collusive tendering and divide market shares in illegal cartel agreements. In order to stabilise cartels, participants need to ward off new competitors and prevent cheating within the cartel. The question why we see a system of collusion involving organised crime and viole...
In December 2002 the final report of the Royal Commission concerning Irregularities in the Dutch Con...
In December 2002 the final report of the Royal Commission concerning Irregularities in the Dutch Con...
Despite the fact that competition law prohibits explicit cartels but not tacit collusion, theories o...
In this article, two case studies of large-scale bid rigging in the construction industry in Canada ...
Firms enter cartels (e.g. price-fixing; bid-rigging) in order to control market uncertainties and ga...
Criminological study of the social organisation of business cartels. How are business cartels embedd...
This article examines how corporate crime is organised through studying the longevity of illegal bus...
Firms enter cartels (e.g. price-fixing; bid-rigging) in order to control market uncertainties and ga...
This work sets out ambitiously to be a first dedicated criminology of business cartels. The topic - ...
This work sets out ambitiously to be a first dedicated criminology of business cartels. The topic - ...
Over the last 10 to 15 years there has been a significant movement towards criminalisation of involv...
Over the last 10 to 15 years there has been a significant movement towards criminalisation of involv...
Over the last dozen years or so there has been a burgeoning of criminal law for purposes of dealing ...
Over the last dozen years or so there has been a burgeoning of criminal law for purposes of dealing ...
In December 2002 the final report of the Royal Commission concerning Irregularities in the Dutch Con...
In December 2002 the final report of the Royal Commission concerning Irregularities in the Dutch Con...
In December 2002 the final report of the Royal Commission concerning Irregularities in the Dutch Con...
Despite the fact that competition law prohibits explicit cartels but not tacit collusion, theories o...
In this article, two case studies of large-scale bid rigging in the construction industry in Canada ...
Firms enter cartels (e.g. price-fixing; bid-rigging) in order to control market uncertainties and ga...
Criminological study of the social organisation of business cartels. How are business cartels embedd...
This article examines how corporate crime is organised through studying the longevity of illegal bus...
Firms enter cartels (e.g. price-fixing; bid-rigging) in order to control market uncertainties and ga...
This work sets out ambitiously to be a first dedicated criminology of business cartels. The topic - ...
This work sets out ambitiously to be a first dedicated criminology of business cartels. The topic - ...
Over the last 10 to 15 years there has been a significant movement towards criminalisation of involv...
Over the last 10 to 15 years there has been a significant movement towards criminalisation of involv...
Over the last dozen years or so there has been a burgeoning of criminal law for purposes of dealing ...
Over the last dozen years or so there has been a burgeoning of criminal law for purposes of dealing ...
In December 2002 the final report of the Royal Commission concerning Irregularities in the Dutch Con...
In December 2002 the final report of the Royal Commission concerning Irregularities in the Dutch Con...
In December 2002 the final report of the Royal Commission concerning Irregularities in the Dutch Con...
Despite the fact that competition law prohibits explicit cartels but not tacit collusion, theories o...