We consider the one-to-one matching models with transfers of Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanié (2015). When the analyst has data on one large market only, we study identification of the systematic components of the agents’ preferences without imposing parametric restrictions on the probability distribution of the latent variables. Specifically, we provide a tractable characterisation of the region of parameter values that exhausts all the implications of the model and data (the sharp identified set), under various classes of nonparametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved terms. We discuss a way to conduct inference on the sharp identified set and conclude with Monte Carlo simulations
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and sep...
Identification in econometric models maps prior assumptions and the data to information about a para...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with p...
In this paper we propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our ...
This paper considers a one-to-one matching model with transferable utilities, in two-sided markets. ...
A large class of two-sided matching models that include both transferable and non-transferable utili...
The statistical matching problem involves the integration of multiple datasets where some variables ...
We propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator appl...
AbstractThe statistical matching problem involves the integration of multiple datasets where some va...
This paper develops a method suggested by the theory to estimate the structural parameters of a two-...
This paper considers two-sided matching models with nontransferable utilities, with one side having ...
We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided matching markets us...
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the characteris...
I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable-utility matching game. Consider data on matches or r...
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and sep...
Identification in econometric models maps prior assumptions and the data to information about a para...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with p...
In this paper we propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our ...
This paper considers a one-to-one matching model with transferable utilities, in two-sided markets. ...
A large class of two-sided matching models that include both transferable and non-transferable utili...
The statistical matching problem involves the integration of multiple datasets where some variables ...
We propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator appl...
AbstractThe statistical matching problem involves the integration of multiple datasets where some va...
This paper develops a method suggested by the theory to estimate the structural parameters of a two-...
This paper considers two-sided matching models with nontransferable utilities, with one side having ...
We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided matching markets us...
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the characteris...
I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable-utility matching game. Consider data on matches or r...
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and sep...
Identification in econometric models maps prior assumptions and the data to information about a para...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...