Add to ORKGWhen individuals have private information about their own luck and income, the sharing of idiosyncratic risks is hampered by moral hazard. This friction also affects the optimal sharing of aggregate risks. Optimal allocations restrict the exposure of low wealth agents’ consumption to business cycle risk. This encourages truth-telling by high wealth agents who have a high tolerance for aggregate risk, thereby increasing the extent to which idiosyncratic risks can be shared. Implementation of these optimal allocations requires restrictions in the trade of securities contingent on aggregate outcomes
We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first-b...
This paper examines the impact of risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information on mutual risk-shari...
This paper investigates the sources of imperfect risk sharing using changes in the cross-sectional d...
In this paper we examine conditions under which optimal risk sharing may not fully insure individual...
This paper studies Pareto-optimal risk-sharing arrangements in a private information economy with ag...
This paper examines the impact of risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information on mutual risk-shari...
This paper examines the impact of risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information on mutual risk-shari...
This paper studies Pareto-optimal risk-sharing arrangements in a private information economy with ag...
According to the conventional view on efficient risk sharing (Hirshleifer, 1971), better information...
We introduce limited liability in a model with a continuum of ex ante identical agents who face aggr...
We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first-b...
We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first-b...
JEL No. D82,E21 We derive testable implications of model in which first best allocations are not ach...
We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first b...
Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an...
We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first-b...
This paper examines the impact of risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information on mutual risk-shari...
This paper investigates the sources of imperfect risk sharing using changes in the cross-sectional d...
In this paper we examine conditions under which optimal risk sharing may not fully insure individual...
This paper studies Pareto-optimal risk-sharing arrangements in a private information economy with ag...
This paper examines the impact of risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information on mutual risk-shari...
This paper examines the impact of risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information on mutual risk-shari...
This paper studies Pareto-optimal risk-sharing arrangements in a private information economy with ag...
According to the conventional view on efficient risk sharing (Hirshleifer, 1971), better information...
We introduce limited liability in a model with a continuum of ex ante identical agents who face aggr...
We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first-b...
We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first-b...
JEL No. D82,E21 We derive testable implications of model in which first best allocations are not ach...
We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first b...
Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an...
We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which first-b...
This paper examines the impact of risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information on mutual risk-shari...
This paper investigates the sources of imperfect risk sharing using changes in the cross-sectional d...