Responsibility for human rights violations, institutions and transnational duties

This thesis proposes a conception of responsibility for human rights. The conception includes three components: an account of the normative foundations of human rights; an account of human-rights correlative duties; and an account of the violations of human rights. The account on the normative foundations connects human rights with certain moral principles and shows why those rights might impose obligations to various agents. The account on the corresponding duties uncovers different categories of duties related to human rights and formulates general guidelines for the distribution of these duties. The account on violations lists the conditions that must obtain for something to qualify as a violation of human rights. All these components are reunited in an internationalist conception of responsibility for human rights. According to this conception, human rights serve the dignity of persons. Since the protection of the dignity of persons requires the social world to be designed in a certain way, State agents bear primary responsibility in guaranteeing the human rights of their populations. Notwithstanding that, human rights impose on other non-State agents second order duties to contribute with the capacity of their political institutions to comply with their human rights related obligations. The international community in particular has transnational duties to create the adequate international conditions necessary for every political community to be able to fully realize the human rights of their population. Although these second order duties are derived from human rights, their non-compliance does not amount to a human rights violation