This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Oxford University Press (OUP) via the DOI in this record.We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characterized by a continuous trait and a binary attribute. The model incorporates attributes for which there are heterogeneous preferences in the population regarding their desirability, that is, the impact of the traits cannot be summarized by a one-dimensional attractiveness index. We present a general resolution strategy based on optimal control theory, and characterize the stable matching. We then consider education and smoking status, further specify the model by observing that there are more male than female smoker...
In this paper, we consider a one-to-one matching model with two phases; an adolescence phase where i...
This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where ex-ante heterogenous individua...
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and...
We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characteri...
We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characteri...
We develop a bidimensional matching model under transferable utility, where individuals are characte...
We develop a bidimensional frictionless matching model under transferable utility, where individuals...
We develop a matching model on the marriage market, where individuals have preferences over the smok...
We construct a matching model on the marriage market along more than one characteristic, where indiv...
This paper provides an assessment of the implementation of a canonical two-sided matching model usin...
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteri...
This dissertation studies equilibrium matching patterns in the marriage and labor markets when agent...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
This paper considers equilibrium two-sided search with ex ante heterogeneous agents, vectors of attr...
This is a chapter in preparation for the Handbook of Family Economics, Shelly Lundberg and Alessandr...
In this paper, we consider a one-to-one matching model with two phases; an adolescence phase where i...
This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where ex-ante heterogenous individua...
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and...
We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characteri...
We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characteri...
We develop a bidimensional matching model under transferable utility, where individuals are characte...
We develop a bidimensional frictionless matching model under transferable utility, where individuals...
We develop a matching model on the marriage market, where individuals have preferences over the smok...
We construct a matching model on the marriage market along more than one characteristic, where indiv...
This paper provides an assessment of the implementation of a canonical two-sided matching model usin...
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteri...
This dissertation studies equilibrium matching patterns in the marriage and labor markets when agent...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
This paper considers equilibrium two-sided search with ex ante heterogeneous agents, vectors of attr...
This is a chapter in preparation for the Handbook of Family Economics, Shelly Lundberg and Alessandr...
In this paper, we consider a one-to-one matching model with two phases; an adolescence phase where i...
This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where ex-ante heterogenous individua...
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and...