Add to ORKGThis paper studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Creditors (retail banks) receive imperfect signals regarding the profitability of borrowers (wholesale banks) and, based on these signals and their beliefs about other creditors actions, choose whether to rollover funding, or not. The uncoordinated actions of creditors cause a suboptimal incidence of rollover, generating an illiquidity premium. Leverage magnifies the coordination inefficiency. Illiquidity shocks in credit markets result in sharp contractions in output. Policy responses are analyzed.Publisher PD
The breakdown of short-term funding markets was a key feature of the global financial crisis of 2007...
We develop a theoretical model where a redistribution of bank capital (e.g., due to reckless trading...
The breakdown of short-term funding markets was a key feature of the global financial crisis of 2007...
This article studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general ...
This paper studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general eq...
In this paper I propose a two-step theoretical extension of the baseline model by Diamond and Rajan ...
I present a mechanism that relies on the interaction of coordination and ambiguity (Knightian uncert...
This dissertation studies financial fragility caused by coordination failure and discusses plausible...
This dissertation studies financial fragility caused by coordination failure and discusses plausible...
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Comp...
Motivated by the credit crisis 2007-08, this paper presents a theory of "capital market banks"; bank...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model of production economies with adverse selection in the...
This dissertation studies financial fragility caused by coordination failure and discusses plausible...
Motivated by the credit crisis 2007-08, this paper presents a theory of "capital market banks"; bank...
The breakdown of short-term funding markets was a key feature of the global financial crisis of 2007...
The breakdown of short-term funding markets was a key feature of the global financial crisis of 2007...
We develop a theoretical model where a redistribution of bank capital (e.g., due to reckless trading...
The breakdown of short-term funding markets was a key feature of the global financial crisis of 2007...
This article studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general ...
This paper studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general eq...
In this paper I propose a two-step theoretical extension of the baseline model by Diamond and Rajan ...
I present a mechanism that relies on the interaction of coordination and ambiguity (Knightian uncert...
This dissertation studies financial fragility caused by coordination failure and discusses plausible...
This dissertation studies financial fragility caused by coordination failure and discusses plausible...
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Comp...
Motivated by the credit crisis 2007-08, this paper presents a theory of "capital market banks"; bank...
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model of production economies with adverse selection in the...
This dissertation studies financial fragility caused by coordination failure and discusses plausible...
Motivated by the credit crisis 2007-08, this paper presents a theory of "capital market banks"; bank...
The breakdown of short-term funding markets was a key feature of the global financial crisis of 2007...
The breakdown of short-term funding markets was a key feature of the global financial crisis of 2007...
We develop a theoretical model where a redistribution of bank capital (e.g., due to reckless trading...
The breakdown of short-term funding markets was a key feature of the global financial crisis of 2007...