This paper uses Social Security earnings records linked to data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine the labor market behavior of rejected and accepted disability applicants prior to their application. We find that rejected applicants have substantially lower earnings and labor force participation rates during the decade prior to application than beneficiaries. Also, we find some evidence of a divergence between these groups, with rejected applicants leaving the labor force at a faster rate than beneficiaries as their application date approaches. One interpretation of these results is that the disability screening process on average separates those who are at least partially motivated by adverse economic circumstances when apply...
We present the first causal estimates of the effect of Social Security Disability Insurance benefit ...
Between 1984 and 2001, the share of nonelderly adults receiving Social Security Disability Insurance...
Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized for their apparent work disincentives. ...
This paper uses Social Security earnings records linked to data from the Health and Retirement Study...
We use administrative longitudinal data on earnings, impairment, and mortality to replicate and exte...
Working Paper: WP 2014-305Recent studies find that many workers do not return to the labor force aft...
An influential body of research studies the labor supply and earnings of denied Social Security Disa...
Longitudinal administrative data show that younger rejected male applicants to the Disability Insura...
While a growing literature confirms that applications to Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) i...
Applicants for Social Security disability benefits who fail to pass the medical screening form a nat...
We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI)...
We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force ...
Over the last 25 years the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (DI) has grown dramatically...
We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force ...
We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force ...
We present the first causal estimates of the effect of Social Security Disability Insurance benefit ...
Between 1984 and 2001, the share of nonelderly adults receiving Social Security Disability Insurance...
Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized for their apparent work disincentives. ...
This paper uses Social Security earnings records linked to data from the Health and Retirement Study...
We use administrative longitudinal data on earnings, impairment, and mortality to replicate and exte...
Working Paper: WP 2014-305Recent studies find that many workers do not return to the labor force aft...
An influential body of research studies the labor supply and earnings of denied Social Security Disa...
Longitudinal administrative data show that younger rejected male applicants to the Disability Insura...
While a growing literature confirms that applications to Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) i...
Applicants for Social Security disability benefits who fail to pass the medical screening form a nat...
We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI)...
We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force ...
Over the last 25 years the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (DI) has grown dramatically...
We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force ...
We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force ...
We present the first causal estimates of the effect of Social Security Disability Insurance benefit ...
Between 1984 and 2001, the share of nonelderly adults receiving Social Security Disability Insurance...
Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized for their apparent work disincentives. ...