Semiotics and the Something : a Pragmatist Perspective on the Debate on Realism

My intention in this paper is to contribute the debate on \u201crealism\u201d in order to raise a different sort of question: not whether \u2018reality\u2019 exists or does not exist, but rather what effects does the belief in this or that reality produce (as Peirce put it 150 years ago). I will turn to Eco\u2019s later thought, and to his support for a form of \u2018negative\u2019 realism, and try to demonstrate how his appeal to Peirce\u2019s distinction between Immediate and Dynamical Object is affected by a common-sense interpretation of what \u2018real\u2019 amounts to. Peirce in fact distinguished between the \u201cexistence\u201d of facts and their \u201creality.\u201d The former implies a dynamic of blind force, a dynamical reaction. Yet, \u201creality consists in the future\u201d (CP 8.284), in the public recognition of what it always will be, or we hope will be, in the long run (Peirce uses the word \u201cmellonization\u201d). In Eco\u2019s work, though, the Being or the Real, seen as pure Something, is understood after the form of a Thing, above all External, which simply says many \u2018No\u2019s. Peirce\u2019s pragmaticism leads us further on, concentrating on the concept of habit that is also detectable in Eco\u2019s analysis. We could say that Peirce distinguishes brute existence hic et nunc from the persistence of habits. Acts and dispositions to act, and not facts (as opposed to interpretations) appear as real; and it is in this respect that I think we can find a promising line of research for better explaining Eco\u2019s theory of realism