A Defense of Strict Petrazyckianism (in Russian)

In Human rights in the context of a Petra\u17cyckian perspective Prof. Polyakov criticized Fittipaldi\u2019s \u201cStrict Petra\u17cyckianism\u201d. Here Fittipaldi replies to Polyakov\u2019s critiques. Fittipaldi argues that scientific concepts select classes of phenomena able to enter as causes into nomological hypotheses. Law, stipulatively defined as a particular class of psychical phenomena (psylaw)\u2014namely, as perceptions/representations of actions coupled imperative-attributive emotions (a concept close to sense of entitlement)\u2014is the proximate cause of conflicts and, in turn, of unifying tendencies somewhat counteracting them (positivization, formalizations, adjudication). Further, psylaw causes the emergence of soclaw, understood as a gradual phenomenon whose degrees of existence increase with the degree of compatibility of the jural phenomena (psylaw) occurring in a given society. If psylaw is the distal cause of phenomena like states or market economies, soclaw can be regarded as their proximal cause, and so can be regarded as a scientific concept in its own right. In the remaining parts of this essay Fittipaldi defends the distinction between of intuitive and positive psylaw, and underscores the need both of legal dogmatics (understood as including deontic logic) and of sharply distinguishing it from psylaw and soclaw, thus implying that strict Petra\u17cyckianism is incompatible with integral concepts of law