In defense of neo-tribunes: a liberal republican reform

Rising populisms around current Western democracies have recently come to many political philosophers\u2019 attention. Especially in the EU, the two decades-lasting debate on democracy\u2019s accountability crisis has been rephrased with a new heed on populist deformation of our political systems. While a broadly defined \u2018populism\u2019 seems to be growing in European civil societies (Podemos, Movimento 5 Stelle, Front National, Syriza), most of the intellectual world is still engaged in a staunched defense of traditional democratic institutions (Urbinati, Pettit). John P. McCormick constitutes a lonely, provocative advocate of a radical form of \u2018populist democracy\u2019, which according to him would have the merit of fighting back many ongoing shortcomings that vex current representative democracies. Notably, his model allegedly offers a remedy to bursting economic inequalities, which not only impact on the equal amount of political power citizens should be able to afford, but also does so to such extent that the very democratic essence of nowadays political institutions is called into question. McCormick leans on a three-featured institutional reform in order to neutralize this oligarchic tendency routed in any representative system: (1) offices that exclude the wealthiest citizens from eligibility; (2) selection procedures for those offices combining both election and lottery; (3) offices\u2019 power to institute political trials over politicians\u2019 deeds. This reform project targets oligarchic effects of elections and aims at countervailing them by handing back part of the political power to a small assembly of \u2018common citizens\u2019 selected by lot. In so doing, it resonates with both ancient Rome\u2019s tribunes of the plebs and deliberative models of mini-public. In this paper we will argue that such proposal falls short of its proclaimed aim to contribute in the neutralization of wealthiest \ue9lites\u2019 power. First of all, we introduce McCormick\u2019s Neo-Romanian scheme and its expected effects on political decisions. Second, we claim that such a scheme has two major drawbacks. On one hand there is a theoretical pitfall, which rests on a sociological understanding of \u2018the people\u2019 as opposed to \u2018the wealthiest\u2019, inherited from Machiavelli, that conflicts with commonly shared liberal principles of individual freedom. On the other, the practical shortcoming consists in the model\u2019s lack of effectiveness due to a traditional accountability issue. Finally, we put forward our improved version of McCormick\u2019s institutional design and provide arguments for its effectiveness and feasibility. Such version still focuses on the role of \u2018neo-tribunes\u2019, but it does not explicitly pick on the wealthiest. Instead of giving tribunes the direct power to veto laws introduced by the legislative, we assign them the power to indict an abrogative referendum. If three referendum fail, all neo-tribunes loose their office and another group is randomly selected. This would limit the tribunes\u2019 personal power by linking it more straightforwardly with the people at large, and at the same time would not excessively slow down the introduction of new laws which a modern democracy requires. Moreover, it radicalizes McCormick\u2019s intent by making explicit and direct recourse to the people largely intended and it is still able to marginalize wealthiest \ue9lites\u2019 power without formally discriminate them