Add to ORKGLeader-follower (LF) equilibria play a central role in several applications of game theory. In spite of this, the literature only presents sporadic results for the case with two or more followers. In this work, we address the problem of computing LF equilibria in this setting, assuming that the followers play a Nash Equilibrium after the leader\u2019s commitment
We parameterize commitment in leader-follower games by letting the leader publicly choose her action...
A basic model of commitment is to convert a game in strategic form to a “leadership game” with the s...
This thesis studies various equilibrium concepts in the context of finite games of infinite duration...
In this paper, we discuss a particular class of Nash games, where the participants of the game (the ...
In this paper, we discuss a particular class of Nash games, where the participants of the game (the ...
A basic model of commitment is to convert a game in strategic form into a "leadership game&quo...
We consider two-stage multi-leader-follower games, called multi-leader-follower games with vertical ...
We consider two-stage multi-leader-follower games, called multi-leader-follower games with vertical ...
In this thesis, we study two kinds of problems related to each other; the multi-leader-follower game...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
We parameterize commitment in leader-follower games by letting the leader publicly choose her action...
A basic model of commitment is to convert a game in strategic form to a “leadership game” with the s...
This thesis studies various equilibrium concepts in the context of finite games of infinite duration...
In this paper, we discuss a particular class of Nash games, where the participants of the game (the ...
In this paper, we discuss a particular class of Nash games, where the participants of the game (the ...
A basic model of commitment is to convert a game in strategic form into a "leadership game&quo...
We consider two-stage multi-leader-follower games, called multi-leader-follower games with vertical ...
We consider two-stage multi-leader-follower games, called multi-leader-follower games with vertical ...
In this thesis, we study two kinds of problems related to each other; the multi-leader-follower game...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real...
We parameterize commitment in leader-follower games by letting the leader publicly choose her action...
A basic model of commitment is to convert a game in strategic form to a “leadership game” with the s...
This thesis studies various equilibrium concepts in the context of finite games of infinite duration...