On the Nature of Social Kinds

According to the so-called difference thesis, unlike natural kinds, some social kinds depend ontologically on our attitudes toward them. The difference thesis puts realism into question. It implies that these kinds can only be invented, not discovered, and that we cannot be wrong about them. In this chapter, I will challenge the difference thesis, arguing that dependence on collective propositional attitudes directed toward the kind itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for an institutional kind to exist. I will argue that it is unnecessary and insufficient even for the core cases \u2013 like money \u2013 that are usually cited in support of the thesis. If I am right, then realism holds across the board. Institutional kinds are not radically different from natural kinds: their properties ought to be discovered, and people can be massively wrong about them. Folk concepts and institutional kinds may diverge considerably, and social science is the best source of knowledge we have concerning the structure of social reality