Several studies show that evolution favors non-selfish preferences only if preference types are observable. We present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the Centipede Game, where we adopt self-confirming equilibrium to capture behavior. We show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable
Genuine altruism would appear to be incompatible with evolutionary theory. And yet altruistic behavi...
We provide a generalized definition of evolutionary stability of heritable types in arbitrarily larg...
We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-...
Several studies show that evolution favors non-selfish preferences only if preference types are obse...
I analyze the evolution of altruistic preferences in a pop-ulation where individuals are matched pai...
A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferences is that evolution favors nonmater...
The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and ...
A candidate explanation for the persistence of heterogeneous behavior in a sequential social dilemma...
Understanding the behavioral and psychological mechanisms underlying social behaviors is one of the ...
The centipede game posits one of the most well-known paradoxes of backward induction in the literatu...
Abstract: We study environments in which an individual gets a higher payoff from defecting than from...
This paper studies the evolutionary properties of the Centipede Game. For this game, the use of back...
When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typi...
Genuine altruism would appear to be incompatible with evolutionary theory. And yet altruistic behavi...
We provide a generalized definition of evolutionary stability of heritable types in arbitrarily larg...
We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-...
Several studies show that evolution favors non-selfish preferences only if preference types are obse...
I analyze the evolution of altruistic preferences in a pop-ulation where individuals are matched pai...
A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferences is that evolution favors nonmater...
The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and ...
A candidate explanation for the persistence of heterogeneous behavior in a sequential social dilemma...
Understanding the behavioral and psychological mechanisms underlying social behaviors is one of the ...
The centipede game posits one of the most well-known paradoxes of backward induction in the literatu...
Abstract: We study environments in which an individual gets a higher payoff from defecting than from...
This paper studies the evolutionary properties of the Centipede Game. For this game, the use of back...
When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typi...
Genuine altruism would appear to be incompatible with evolutionary theory. And yet altruistic behavi...
We provide a generalized definition of evolutionary stability of heritable types in arbitrarily larg...
We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-...
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