The purpose of this study is to investigate if audited financial statements add value for firms in the private debt market. Using an instrumental variable method, we find that firms with audited financial statements, on average, save 0.47 percentage points on the cost of debt compared to firms with unaudited financial statements. We also find that using the big, well-known auditing firms does not yield any additional cost of debt benefits. Lastly, we investigate if there are industries where alternative sources of information make auditing less valuable in reducing the cost of debt. Here we find that auditing is less important in lowering cost in one industry, agriculture, where one lender has a 74% market share and a 100-year history of le...
This study aims to verify the effects of different methods of debt financing on firm value. The most...
ABSTRACT: We test the relationship between the change in a firm’s cost of debt and the disclosure of...
This study examines how outside large shareholders’ monitoring of management, and its interaction wi...
The purpose of this study is to investigate if audited financial statements add value for firms in t...
The purpose of this study is to investigate if audited financial statements add value for firms in t...
I examine how the verification of financial statements influences lenders’ debt pricing decisions. ...
Abstract: We examine the impact of auditor choice on debt pricing in firms ’ early public years when...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the circumstances under which high quality aud...
AbstractThis study aims to examine the relationship of having financial statements audited by extern...
Purpose: This study aims to examine the impact of auditor choice on debt pricing for listed companie...
This study investigates the role of auditor choice (Big 4/Non-Big 4) in debt financing for private a...
Using a sample of 560 new debt issues, we investigate the relation between audit, nonaudit, and tota...
Purpose – This paper aims to examine whether firms retaining industry-specialist auditors receive be...
We examine the role of auditor choice in debt pricing in private firms. Because both Moody's and Sta...
In this study, we examine the effect of a borrower having the same auditor as its main creditor bank...
This study aims to verify the effects of different methods of debt financing on firm value. The most...
ABSTRACT: We test the relationship between the change in a firm’s cost of debt and the disclosure of...
This study examines how outside large shareholders’ monitoring of management, and its interaction wi...
The purpose of this study is to investigate if audited financial statements add value for firms in t...
The purpose of this study is to investigate if audited financial statements add value for firms in t...
I examine how the verification of financial statements influences lenders’ debt pricing decisions. ...
Abstract: We examine the impact of auditor choice on debt pricing in firms ’ early public years when...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the circumstances under which high quality aud...
AbstractThis study aims to examine the relationship of having financial statements audited by extern...
Purpose: This study aims to examine the impact of auditor choice on debt pricing for listed companie...
This study investigates the role of auditor choice (Big 4/Non-Big 4) in debt financing for private a...
Using a sample of 560 new debt issues, we investigate the relation between audit, nonaudit, and tota...
Purpose – This paper aims to examine whether firms retaining industry-specialist auditors receive be...
We examine the role of auditor choice in debt pricing in private firms. Because both Moody's and Sta...
In this study, we examine the effect of a borrower having the same auditor as its main creditor bank...
This study aims to verify the effects of different methods of debt financing on firm value. The most...
ABSTRACT: We test the relationship between the change in a firm’s cost of debt and the disclosure of...
This study examines how outside large shareholders’ monitoring of management, and its interaction wi...