Based on a unique data set of driving behavior we test whether private information in driving characteristics has significant effects on contract choice and risk in automobile insurance. We define a driving factor based on overall distance driven, number of car rides, and speeding. Using local weather conditions, we account for the endogeneity of the driving factor. While this driving factor has an effect on risk, there is no significant evidence for selection effects in the level of third-party liability and first-party insurance coverage
[[abstract]]Little works had well discussed how insured’s behavior change on risk or risk aversion i...
Most automobile insurance databases contain a large number of policy holders with zero claims. This ...
open3siEmpirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance marke...
Based on a unique data set of driving behavior we find direct evidence that private information has ...
We provide novel insights into the effects of private information in automobile insurance. Our analy...
Road safety policies and automobile insurance contracts often use incentive mechanisms based on traf...
Contract-relevant information asymmetries are known to cause inefficien-cies in markets. The informa...
This article examines whether adverse selection or moral hazard could be induced by rate regulation,...
Automobile insurers currently use available information about the vehicle, the owner and residential...
Contract relevant information asymmetries are known to cause inefficiencies in markets. The informat...
This paper empirically investigates the effect of policyholders’ private information about risky tra...
This paper tests the predictions of adverse selection models, using data from the automobile insuran...
Moral hazard and adverse selection are potentially important features of car insurance markets. Inte...
[[sponsorship]]American Risk and Insurance Association[[conferencetype]]國際[[conferencedate]]20060806...
We examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing...
[[abstract]]Little works had well discussed how insured’s behavior change on risk or risk aversion i...
Most automobile insurance databases contain a large number of policy holders with zero claims. This ...
open3siEmpirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance marke...
Based on a unique data set of driving behavior we find direct evidence that private information has ...
We provide novel insights into the effects of private information in automobile insurance. Our analy...
Road safety policies and automobile insurance contracts often use incentive mechanisms based on traf...
Contract-relevant information asymmetries are known to cause inefficien-cies in markets. The informa...
This article examines whether adverse selection or moral hazard could be induced by rate regulation,...
Automobile insurers currently use available information about the vehicle, the owner and residential...
Contract relevant information asymmetries are known to cause inefficiencies in markets. The informat...
This paper empirically investigates the effect of policyholders’ private information about risky tra...
This paper tests the predictions of adverse selection models, using data from the automobile insuran...
Moral hazard and adverse selection are potentially important features of car insurance markets. Inte...
[[sponsorship]]American Risk and Insurance Association[[conferencetype]]國際[[conferencedate]]20060806...
We examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing...
[[abstract]]Little works had well discussed how insured’s behavior change on risk or risk aversion i...
Most automobile insurance databases contain a large number of policy holders with zero claims. This ...
open3siEmpirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance marke...