Add to ORKGIn economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three axioms: Pareto optimality, symmetry and solidarity. This last property requires that an improvement in the ability to exploit the public goods of some of the agents not decrease the welfare of any of them
First Version: September 2001; This Version: January 2002This paper investigates extensions of the t...
This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characteri...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
In a non-welfaristic framework, Sen (1993) extends the first fundamental welfare theorem by demonstr...
In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence o...
mura and Yves Sprumont for helpful comments. This paper investigates extensions of the two fundament...
Welfare theorems are concerned with the conditions under which decentralized decision making can lea...
We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic p...
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival g...
The article deals with the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics for production economies wi...
A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public pro...
This dissertation studies strategic social influence in the presence of a self-control problem and e...
Many normatively oriented economists, legal academics and other policy analysts appear to be welfar...
First Version: September 2001; This Version: January 2002This paper investigates extensions of the t...
This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characteri...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
In a non-welfaristic framework, Sen (1993) extends the first fundamental welfare theorem by demonstr...
In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence o...
mura and Yves Sprumont for helpful comments. This paper investigates extensions of the two fundament...
Welfare theorems are concerned with the conditions under which decentralized decision making can lea...
We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic p...
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival g...
The article deals with the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics for production economies wi...
A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public pro...
This dissertation studies strategic social influence in the presence of a self-control problem and e...
Many normatively oriented economists, legal academics and other policy analysts appear to be welfar...
First Version: September 2001; This Version: January 2002This paper investigates extensions of the t...
This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characteri...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...