Add to ORKGThis paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures for many-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing the student¿ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium
This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of mat...
This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets,...
In this paper, we model college admissions under early decision in a many-to-one matching framework ...
This paper studies sequential mechanisms which mimic a matching procedures for many-to-one real life...
This paper studies sequential mechanisms which mimic matching prodedures for many-to-one real life m...
This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations in the core of matching markets...
This paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple ap...
This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of mat...
This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets,...
In this paper, we model college admissions under early decision in a many-to-one matching framework ...
This paper studies sequential mechanisms which mimic a matching procedures for many-to-one real life...
This paper studies sequential mechanisms which mimic matching prodedures for many-to-one real life m...
This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations in the core of matching markets...
This paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple ap...
This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of mat...
This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets,...
In this paper, we model college admissions under early decision in a many-to-one matching framework ...