The Harsanyi paradox and the ¿right to talk¿ in bargaining among coalitions

I describe a new coalitional value from a non-cooperative point of view, assuming coalitions are formed for the purpose of bargaining. The idea is that all the players have the same chances to make proposals. This means that players maintain their own ¿right to talk¿ when joining a coalition. The resulting value coincides with the weighted Shapley value in the game between coalitions, with weights given by the size of the coalitions. I apply this value to an intriguing example presented by Krasa, Temimi and Yannelis (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003) and show that the Harsanyi paradox (forming a coalition may be disadvantageous) disappears. These results throw certain doubts on the reasonability of the Carrier axiom as presented by Hart and Kurz (Econometrica, 1983)