Carey and Shugart (1995) suggest that under closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) legislators are more likely to seek votes based on their personal attributes as the number of seats per constituency (known as district magnitude or simply as M) decreases. By contrast, in open-list proportional representation (OLPR) the incentives for legislators to seek votes based on their personal reputation should increase as M increases. I test these scholars’ predictions and argue that regardless of the electoral system, legislators will focus on the provision of local public goods, known as pork-barrel politics, the smaller the M, because then it is easier to claim personal credit for projects for their constituencies. In OLPR the importance ...
How do electoral systems and intra-party candidate selection procedures shape legis-lators ’ incenti...
Although observers of Brazilian politics commonly hold that voters reward incumbents for “bring-ing ...
How legislators behave and how cohesively parties act are influenced, to a great extent, by the inst...
Carey and Shugart (1995) suggest that under closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) legislato...
Can electoral systems determine how particularistic spending is distributed in developing countries?...
Abstract: A central challenge in political economy is to identify the conditions under which legisla...
A substantial body of work in political economics has presumed the veracity of David Mayhew’s classi...
How does the electoral geography of legislative districts affect pork barreling? This article presen...
Central to the distributive theory is the idea that members of Congress can use strategic committee ...
We investigate the political factors involved in the allocation of public investments into Turkish e...
This paper uses experiments to explore electoral accountability in a legislative system that favors ...
This paper models the distribution of pork barrel when the electoral benefit of pork does not accrue...
This paper investigates how different electoral rules influence political corruption. We argue that ...
[eng] Nevertheless, this peculiarity of the Spanish political system did not eliminate the incentive...
A key finding in the political economy literature is that political elites display partisan biases w...
How do electoral systems and intra-party candidate selection procedures shape legis-lators ’ incenti...
Although observers of Brazilian politics commonly hold that voters reward incumbents for “bring-ing ...
How legislators behave and how cohesively parties act are influenced, to a great extent, by the inst...
Carey and Shugart (1995) suggest that under closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) legislato...
Can electoral systems determine how particularistic spending is distributed in developing countries?...
Abstract: A central challenge in political economy is to identify the conditions under which legisla...
A substantial body of work in political economics has presumed the veracity of David Mayhew’s classi...
How does the electoral geography of legislative districts affect pork barreling? This article presen...
Central to the distributive theory is the idea that members of Congress can use strategic committee ...
We investigate the political factors involved in the allocation of public investments into Turkish e...
This paper uses experiments to explore electoral accountability in a legislative system that favors ...
This paper models the distribution of pork barrel when the electoral benefit of pork does not accrue...
This paper investigates how different electoral rules influence political corruption. We argue that ...
[eng] Nevertheless, this peculiarity of the Spanish political system did not eliminate the incentive...
A key finding in the political economy literature is that political elites display partisan biases w...
How do electoral systems and intra-party candidate selection procedures shape legis-lators ’ incenti...
Although observers of Brazilian politics commonly hold that voters reward incumbents for “bring-ing ...
How legislators behave and how cohesively parties act are influenced, to a great extent, by the inst...