ONTOLOGY AND ANALYSIS (RUSSELL, WITTGENSTEIN, CARNAP, QUINE)

Ontology and Analysis is more concerned with the question What is real? and with what is involved in providing an adequate answer than with what its answer turns out to be. Though I begin with the debate between Russell and Meinong over what to count as real, examination of their disagreement reveals that it hinges on differing conceptions of linguistic analysis. After arguing that Russell\u27s defense of his position is less than conclusive, I take up the notion of an ideal language with the hope that clarity here might help to resolve the issue. In chapter two I claim that it is possible to construct an ideal language independently of one\u27s ontological predelictions, so that the use of such a language may yield ontological results without begging ontological questions, and I claim that Wittgenstein was engaged in such a project in his Tractatus. I offer an interpretation of the Tractatus intended to support these claims. Chapter three is concerned with some of the more technical aspects of Wittgenstein\u27s view. If Wittgenstein is right, it turns out that the dispute between Russell and Meinong can\u27t really be formulated, much less resolved. Ontological claims are nonsense. Chapter four addresses Carnap\u27s view of ontological questions. Though I find his criticism of Wittgenstein flawed, I go on to develop the idea that ontological questions are really disguised questions about language. I argue that most contemporary criticism of Carnap fails. In particular, I try to show that Quine\u27s criticisms are unsuccessful. The final chapter is a critical exposition of Quine\u27s conception of what there is, and of how he arrives at it. Finally, in the concluding remarks, I offer a brief sketch of the view at the end of the journey, as well as a suggestion for further research