A Stackelberg Analysis of the Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries

To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United\ud Nations Fish Stock Agreement calls for the establishment of regional fisheries management organizations\ud to manage such stocks. This paper studies the potential for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries when\ud the cooperative coalition of countries acts as a Stackelberg leader against the remaining singleton\ud countries. It is demonstrated that an increase in the cooperation level leads to an increase not only in the\ud steady-state fish stock, but also in the total rent of the fishery. Further, the outlook for cooperation is\ud better within the Stackelberg game, where the cooperative coalition acts as a leader, than in the Cournot\ud game. At the stable equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, not only is the steady-state fish stock higher, but\ud also the total resource rent, participants’ rent and non-participants’ rent are higher than those of the\ud Cournot–Nash stable equilibrium. The new-entrant issue is also a problem for the conservation of the fish\ud stock in the Stackelberg game. According to the present research, the prospects of cooperation in utilizing\ud a straddling fish stock are not unlikely if the cooperative coalition acts as a leader. This is an important\ud implication for policymakers when discussing an agreement for establishing a regional fisheries\ud management organization (RFMO) to manage a straddling fish stock