Agreement between \independent" measurements of a theoretically posited quantity is intuitively compelling evidence that a theory is, loosely speaking, on the right track. But exactly what conclusion is warranted by such agreement? I propose a new account of the phenomenon's epistemic significance within the framework of Bayesian epistemology. I contrast my proposal with the standard Bayesian treatment, which lumps the phenomenon under the heading of \evidential diversity.
Three prominent views in the epistemology of disagreement: I Equal weight view: I should assign as m...
Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation the...
Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, rec...
Agreement between \independent" measurements of a theoretically posited quantity is intuitively comp...
Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific r...
The proportional weight view in epistemology of disagreement generalizes the equal weight view and p...
In this chapter we draw connections between two seemingly opposing approaches to probability and sta...
One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession...
Peter Brössel and Franz Huber in 2015 argued that the Bayesian concept of confirmation had no use. I...
Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception...
Subjective Bayesians assume that epistemic/actual agents φ/ψ have degrees of confidence or degrees o...
While Bayesian analysis has enjoyed notable success with many particular problems of inductive infer...
The performance characteristics of a detectionsystem are usually described in terms of accu-racy and...
We propose a logic to reason about data collected by a number of measurement systems. The semantic o...
Abstract The problem addressed in this paper is "the main epistemic problem concerning science&...
Three prominent views in the epistemology of disagreement: I Equal weight view: I should assign as m...
Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation the...
Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, rec...
Agreement between \independent" measurements of a theoretically posited quantity is intuitively comp...
Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific r...
The proportional weight view in epistemology of disagreement generalizes the equal weight view and p...
In this chapter we draw connections between two seemingly opposing approaches to probability and sta...
One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession...
Peter Brössel and Franz Huber in 2015 argued that the Bayesian concept of confirmation had no use. I...
Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception...
Subjective Bayesians assume that epistemic/actual agents φ/ψ have degrees of confidence or degrees o...
While Bayesian analysis has enjoyed notable success with many particular problems of inductive infer...
The performance characteristics of a detectionsystem are usually described in terms of accu-racy and...
We propose a logic to reason about data collected by a number of measurement systems. The semantic o...
Abstract The problem addressed in this paper is "the main epistemic problem concerning science&...
Three prominent views in the epistemology of disagreement: I Equal weight view: I should assign as m...
Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation the...
Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, rec...