Institutional Investors, Managerial Incentives, and Firms' Risk Profiles

In this dissertation, I study the influence of monitoring by institutional investors on corporate behavior within the context of CEO compensation-based incentives. I find that institutional investors provide an executive with higher levels of compensation sensitivity with respect to a firm’s equity price (Delta). In contrast to prior literature, however, once I control the dynamic nature of the data, institutional investors do not affect compensation sensitivity with respect to a firm’s equity risk (Vega). Instead, I find that institutional investors appear to influence the risk profile of firm through the firm’s investment, financing and diversification policy choices even after I control for the CEO’s compensation structure. The results suggest that compensation-related incentives to increase risk (i.e. vega) and monitoring by institutional investors are substitutes of each other in that both can offset the managerial incentives to reduce risk that stem from greater levels of compensation delta. These results are robust to potential endogeneity problems that may arise due to the dynamic nature of panel data