Add to ORKGWhy do some employees receive only xed or incentive pay, while others receive a mix of xed and incentive pay? Moreover, why do the lengths of wage contracts di¤er across these types of pay? This paper attempts to respond to this economic puzzle by developing a theoretical model of multiperiod contracts that incorporates short-, medium-, and long-term contracts with di¤erent wage pro les. We obtain di¤erent combinations of these contracts as equilibria when the e¢ ciency of investment in human capital changes endogenously over time
We study incentive-compatible labour contracts in the case where individual productivity, preference...
A dynamic, equilibrium model of long term (implicit) labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric...
In repeated principal-agent models, long-term contracts can improve on short-term contracts only if ...
Why do some employees receive only xed or incentive pay, while others receive a mix of xed and inc...
Labour contracts tend to be more complicated than one simple short or long-term contract which is th...
This paper is the first to develop a theoretical model of multi-period contracts that combine short...
When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by offering w...
Recent research has challenged the ability of sticky price general equilibrium models to generate a ...
This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in ...
This paper formalizes the use of flexible labor contracts in an efficiency wage framework and derive...
This paper examines how the duration of wage contracts influences innovation incentives, wages and e...
Workers and firms prefer to contract infrequently when contract negotiations are costly, resulting i...
This paper examines the choice of contract length for workers who possess unique skills. Uncertainty...
This paper focuses on labor market transitions and especially on those involvingfixed-term contracts...
In this paper we study the effects of the change in contract length on the agents ’ incentives to in...
We study incentive-compatible labour contracts in the case where individual productivity, preference...
A dynamic, equilibrium model of long term (implicit) labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric...
In repeated principal-agent models, long-term contracts can improve on short-term contracts only if ...
Why do some employees receive only xed or incentive pay, while others receive a mix of xed and inc...
Labour contracts tend to be more complicated than one simple short or long-term contract which is th...
This paper is the first to develop a theoretical model of multi-period contracts that combine short...
When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by offering w...
Recent research has challenged the ability of sticky price general equilibrium models to generate a ...
This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in ...
This paper formalizes the use of flexible labor contracts in an efficiency wage framework and derive...
This paper examines how the duration of wage contracts influences innovation incentives, wages and e...
Workers and firms prefer to contract infrequently when contract negotiations are costly, resulting i...
This paper examines the choice of contract length for workers who possess unique skills. Uncertainty...
This paper focuses on labor market transitions and especially on those involvingfixed-term contracts...
In this paper we study the effects of the change in contract length on the agents ’ incentives to in...
We study incentive-compatible labour contracts in the case where individual productivity, preference...
A dynamic, equilibrium model of long term (implicit) labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric...
In repeated principal-agent models, long-term contracts can improve on short-term contracts only if ...