Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily across agents. We show that when each agent's signal space is finite, the agents will commonly learn the value of the parameter, that is, that the true value of the parameter will become approximate common knowledge. The essential step in this argument is to express the expectation of one agent's signals, conditional on those of the other agent, in terms of a Markov chain. This allows us to invoke a contraction mapping principle ensuring that if one agent's signals are close to those expected under a particular value of the parameter, then that age...
We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian agents. We show that, ...
We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly observing each others' ac...
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model...
Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private s...
Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private s...
We study the probability that two or more agents can attain common knowledge of nontrivial events wh...
We study the effect of stochastically delayed communication on common knowledge acquisition (common ...
We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face uncertainty rega...
We consider an infinite collection of agents who make decisions, sequentially, about an unknown unde...
The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This ...
The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This ...
We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each ot...
We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff t...
We study the effect of stochastically delayed communication on common knowledge acquisition (common ...
We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others’ actions...
We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian agents. We show that, ...
We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly observing each others' ac...
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model...
Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private s...
Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private s...
We study the probability that two or more agents can attain common knowledge of nontrivial events wh...
We study the effect of stochastically delayed communication on common knowledge acquisition (common ...
We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face uncertainty rega...
We consider an infinite collection of agents who make decisions, sequentially, about an unknown unde...
The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This ...
The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This ...
We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each ot...
We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff t...
We study the effect of stochastically delayed communication on common knowledge acquisition (common ...
We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others’ actions...
We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian agents. We show that, ...
We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly observing each others' ac...
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model...