Logic of Existence, Ontological Frames, Leibniz's and Gödel's ontolological Proofs

This paper presents the fundamental outlines of two conceptions of ontological frame. The first one connected to Kant's concept of possible object and the second one related to Leibniz’s. Leibniz maintains that the source of possibility is the mere logical consistency of the notions involved, so that possibility coincides with analytical possibility. Kant, instead, argues that consistency is only a necessary component of possibility. According to Kant, something is possible if there is a cause capable of bringing it into existence; to this end consistency alone is not sufficient. Thus, while the Leibnitian notion of consistency is at the root of the concept of analytical possibility, the Kantian notion of possibility is the source of real possibility. This difference underlies the distinction between the ontological structure (which is characterized by Kant’s interpretation) and the Leibnizian ontological structure. Both structures are presented as the semantic basis for two systems of logic of existence (PE and PEL), the second of which is the Leibnizian extension of the first. The distinction between the two different conceptions of ontological structure plays an important role in the discussion of Gödel's ontological proof, that can be formally interpreted on the ontological frame of the pure perfections. While this proof, under some emendation condition, is conclusive in the context of Leibniz's ontological structure, it is not so within the Kantian one. Then, in the second part of this paper I’ll say something about their relations to Leibniz’s and Gödel's ontological argument