The welfare of the child: Problems of indeterminacy and deontology

Recent literature has addressed arguments about the importance of the `welfare of the child' principle (Blyth and Cameron, 1998; Golombok, 1998) in the assessment of the provision of assisted conception services. Two broad positions have emerged concerning the application of this principle: (i) the minimum welfare principle, and (ii) the maximum welfare principle. Pennings (1999) attempts to provide a commonsense resolution to this debate by proposing a `reasonable welfare principle' for the welfare of the child. Whilst, the attempt to move beyond the two present positions is welcomed, there are a number of significant problems with the arguments presented by Pennings (1999). Pennings (1999) correctly outlines the two most widely recognized positions (maximum and minimum welfare principles) concerning the welfare of the child and the provision of assisted conception services. Whilst we are broadly in agreement with the arguments and criticisms presented for the maximum welfare principle, there . .