Efficiency, Risk and Regulation Compliance: Applications to Lake Victoria fisheries

This thesis deals with artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria fisheries. The thesis consists of an introductory chapter and three self-contained papers, which make up the rest of the thesis chapters. The first paper relates to the measurement of efficiency and skipper skill among the artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria, the other two papers related to the measurement of fishers behavioural motivation. Paper 1: Lake Victoria fisheries are important to Tanzanian food security, employment and foreign exchange, but experience declining performance largely due to overfishing and overcapacity. This paper studies technical efficiency and skipper skill using Tanzanian fishery data for the two major species Nile perch and Dagaa. The relative level of efficiency is high in both fisheries and several observable variables linked to skipper skill significantly explain the efficiency level. Paper 2: Using an experimental approach we investigate the risk preferences of artisanal fishers in Tanzania waters of Lake Victoria. The experiment concerns pairwise comparisons of hypothetical fishing trips that vary in expected mean and spread of the net revenue. The results show that about 34% of the fishers can be considered as risk neutral, 32% as risk averse, and 34% as risk seekers. Econometric analysis indicates that the likelihood of belonging to the risk seeking group increases if motorboats are used, if fishing is the main source of household income, and if the fisher is targeting Nile perch. Asset ownership and perhaps socio-economic variables influence risk preferences. Paper 3: This paper analyzes the causes for regulatory compliance using traditional deterrence variables and potential moral and social variables. We use self-reported data from Tanzanian artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria. The results indicate that fishers adjust their violation rates with respect to changes in probability of detection and punishment but also react to legitimacy and social variables. A small group of persistent violators react neither to normative aspects nor to traditional deterrence variables, but systematically violate the regulation and use bribes to avoid punishment