When it comes to money, does the European Council decide? - The Influence of the European Council in the Negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Frameworks of the European Union

This paper examines the outcomes of the negotiations on the multiannual financial frameworks (MFFs) of the European Union (EU). The key hypothesis is that the MFFs will be closer to the position of the member states than to the European Parliament´s (EP). Although the EP´s budgetary powers have been continuously strengthened, the MFFs strongly reflect the political agreements that are reached by the heads of state or government in the European Council. The European Council´s construction of package deals that combine the often conflicting views of the member states leaves the EP with little room to change the final outcome according to its preference. The argument is tested empirically through a comparative case study on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. The results indicate that the MFFs are closer to the negotiation position of the member states. Despite the EP´s attempts to move the MFFs closer towards its position through rejecting the European Council´s political agreements, the outcomes of the interinstitutional agreements between the Council, the EP and the Commission broadly confirmed the compromises struck by the heads of state or government