Efficient Protocol for Authenticated Email Search

Executing authenticated computation on outsourced data is currently an area of major interest in cryptology. Large databases are being outsourced to untrusted servers without appreciable verification mechanisms. As adversarial server could produce erroneous output, clients should not trust the server's response blindly. Primitive set operations like union, set difference, intersection etc. can be invoked on outsourced data in different concrete settings and should be verifiable by the client. One such interesting adaptation is to authenticate email search result where the untrusted mail server has to provide a proof along with the search result. Recently Ohrimenko et al. proposed a scheme for authenticating email search. We suggest significant improvements over their proposal in terms of client computation and communication resources by properly recasting it in two-party settings. In contrast to Ohrimenko et al. we are able to make the number of bilinear pairing evaluation, the costliest operation in verification procedure, independent of the result set cardinality for union operation. We also provide an analytical comparison of our scheme with their proposal which is further corroborated through experiments