Explaining moral knowledge

In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge.First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport toshow that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understoodas the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superiorto a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both argumentsare unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledgeof particular moral facts. I argue that when we are careful to keep separate thevarious explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanationof the fact that (e.g.,) Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficultto come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledgeof particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moralscepticism