Insider Trading Prohibition

V magistrski nalogi sem predstavil ureditev prepovedi trgovanja na podlagi notranjih informacij v Uredbi o zlorabi trga 2014/596/EU, kot je ta relevantna za redno poslovanje izdajatelja finančnih instrumentov v državi članici, predvsem v Sloveniji. Tako sem predstavil prekršek insiderskega trgovanja, ki ga uredba predpisuje, pa tudi dolžnosti razkrivanja, ki na prepovedano trgovanje delujejo preventivno, kjer sem dodal tudi primera takšne objave slovenskih podjetij. Pri tem sem bil pozoren na spremembe, ki jih prinaša nova ureditev Uredbe o zlorabi trga v primerjavi s predhodno direktivo. Preventivni ukrepi imajo v praksi večji pomen, kot sem pričakoval. Veliko pozornosti sem posvetil konkretiziranju definicije notranje informacije, da bi tako prispeval k pravni varnosti zaradi trenutne prekomerne splošnosti tega pojma. Tukaj sem prišel do ugotovitve, da bi se z vidika logične sistematike morala tudi za verjetnost obstoja sedanjega dogodka zahtevati verjetnost 50+%, kot se to glede na strokovno razlago sodne prakse trenutno razlaga samo za verjetnost obstoja prihodnjega dogodka. Prav tako z lastno argumentacijo podprem sicer ponekod kritizirano odločitev Sodišča EU da je tudi informacija, iz katere ni mogoče (objektivno) predvideti smeri premika cene, notranja informacija, saj SEU pravilno upošteva subjektivnost vsakega presojanja nastopa prihodnjega dogodka v okviru testa razumnega vlagatelja. Na kratko povzemam tudi pristojnosti nacionalnih organov v okviru Uredbe o zlorabi trga. V zaključku predstavim in komentiram sodno prakso Sodišča EU za insidersko trgovanje, na katero se sicer sklicujem skozi celotno nalogo.In my master’s thesis, I present the regulation of the prohibition on insider dealing as set forth in the Market Abuse Regulation 2014/596/EU in view of its relevancy for regular business of a financial instruments issuer in a Member State, especially Slovenia. I thus present the offence of insider trading, which the regulation prescribes, as well as disclosure requirements that have a preventive impact on insider trading to which I added two examples from the disclosure practice of Slovenian companies. During this presentation I consider the recent changes that the new Market Abuse Regulation brings in comparison to the previous directive. Preventive measures have a greater impact in practice than I previously anticipated. I devoted considerable attention to the concretization of the definition of inside information in the effort to contribute to legal certainty with the view of current excessive vagueness of the term. Doing so I came to the conclusion that within the internal logic of the legislative scheme, the likelihood of existence of a current event should achieve 50+% as well, same as the likelihood of existence is required for a future event expectation in literature now. I also support the sometimes criticized European Court of Justice decision, according to which an information from which it is impossible to (objectively) ascertain the direction of price movement it will cause, is nevertheless considered inside information, because CJEU correctly takes the subjectivity in making every future event prediction in context of a reasonable investor test into account. In the interest of a holistic presentation I summarize the competences of national law enforcement authorities as well. In the conclusion the paper presents and comments judicial practice of the European Court of Justice which I make reference to throughout the work