Cause and conceptual priority

This essay is divided into two sections. Part one deals with a number of recent attempts in the literature to provide an adequate analysis of the meaning of cause. Among other things, it is shown that the recent criticisms of the Humean view of cause have not succeeded in establishing that constant conjunction is net at least part of the meaning of cause. Part two is concerned to establish the contention by three independent though related arguments, that the concept of cause and the empIoyment of causal verbs is necessary for such basic linguistic functions as identification and description. Part two is thus an exercise in what may be called, for lack of a better term, "descriptive metaphysics". The descriptive metaphysician starts with ordinary Ianguage and its functions, and then attempts to assign a IocaI priority to some of these functions and to the concepts (categories) necessary for the having of such functions. Part one and two are intimately connected for in order to establish that X is logically prior to, or necessary for Y we must be clear as to the meaning of X. For example , in order to establish the IogicaI priority of cause we must have first determined the meaning of that concept. The task is especiaIIy difficult with cause for there are so many competing analyses of the concept. We must be on our guard not to end up showing, that any particular concept of cause, such as the Humean concept, is fundamental, valuable though this conclusion may be. If there is some primary meaning of cause it would suffice to establish that cause in its primary sense is necessary for the purposes of identification and description. If, however, cause does not admit of a primary meaning then our task is more difficult. We shall then have to give a general account of all the various uses of the concept. It is contended that causality is implicated in the instantiation of transitive verbs of action - verbs such as "push", "break", "burn" etc. It is argued that when such verbs are used it is implied that something has done something to something else. Constant conjunction is also implied in the instantiation of such verbs. In part two it is argued that objects and states of affairs could not be adequately described in terms of a language which did not contain causal verbs. It is also argued that we could possess the concept of solidity if we did not know what it was for one object to causally act upon another. Thirdly, it is argued that not only do we as a matter of fact sort objects into kinds on the basis of their causal properties - it is contended that without a knowledge of the different causal properties of objects we could not (logically) group them into kinds