Studies in the development of Plato's metaphysical system

A thesis should speak for itself, and prefatory remarks should hardly be necessary. Three brief ones are, perhaps, called for with the present one. The Bibliography does nit stand at the forefront of the work by chance. Rather, because in it is revealed the pitiful inadequacy of the present writer's reading on the subject-matter, even in his native language (for which he can plead no excuse). Had the sections "Books of Reference", and "Articles", been thrice their actual length, and every work studies in detail from cover to cover (not skimmed through, as has all too often been the case), the results reached might have had some claim to significance. F. M. Cornford (The Unwritten Philosophy, pp. 33, 39) has remarked "Temperament is no conventionally recognised reason; so (the philosopher) urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premisses. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hardhearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it" (from William James)... "if we would really understand what a philosopher says, we must keep a wakeful eye on what he does not say, because he and his opponents take it for granted. There are no personal motives for concealment here. The premisses now in question are not mentioned simply because they seem too obvious to be worth mentioning". This testimony is true. For which cause reprove all historians of philosophy sharply, that they, remembering that they are in the same condemnation, may perchance think that themselves may be mistaken. (And the present writer?). Some of this thesis was written with a view to submission to various journals for publication (but vide supra,). Hence there is a certain lack of direct cross-referencing, and a tendency to restate conclusions reached elsewhere. An important change in the present writer's views will be noticed in Ch. 1V - VII. In Ch. 1V, which was written some months before Ch. V - VII, the interpretation of the Sophist offered by F. M. Cornford was accepted. In Ch. V - III that of A. L. Peck was. The major points at issue in Ch. 1V, viz., the exegesis of Tht. 183 a-c, and of Tm. 49c7-50b5, can, however, stand on either view of the Sophist. Also the tentative suggestions made in the last section of Ch. 1V appear to be unsatisfactory, and a fresh suggestion is offered in Ch. VI