Conventions and speech acts

Conventions play a large part in our lives. When we exchange money for goods, we do so in conformity to conventions. Our mode of dress and manner of eating is largely determined by convention. When we perform linguistically our actions are governed by conventions. The ubiquity of conventions suggests that an analysis of the notion of a convention would have an important place in the attempt to understand social phenomena. We find that philosophers (in particular) have used the idea of a convention freely and widely. They have on occasion employed the notion of a convention to make substantive claims, where the truth of these claims turned crucially on what exactly that notion of a convention was. For example, rival theorists of speech acts have argued about whether speech acts are essentially conventional, (or perhaps, rule-constituted). It is difficult to see how this matter could be settled without some account being offered of conventions. There is an important place then, for an adequate theory of convention. In Parts A and D of this thesis I will attempt to provide such a theory. In Part C I will make certain applications of this theory. In Part C I will be primarily concerned with the question of the conventionality of speech acts