Raymond Williams : a critique of his theory of culture and education

Thesis (M.Ed.)--University of Melbourne, 1981This thesis is a critical exposition of Williams' theory of culture as expounded in two of his early works, Culture and Society 1780-1950, and The Long Revolution, and of the influence of that theory on his views on education. Williams' views on man, on valued knowledge and on the ideal society, being fundamental to an understanding of his theory of culture and its connection with education, are given particular attention. Williams sees man as evolving into a being with a unique brain and hence as having the potential to learn, to reason, to communicate and to create. The process of realising this potential is identified by Williams as both the process of interaction within culture and also the characteristic achievement of culture. However, this thesis argues that such a view of man, allegedly drawn from experience, is selectively based and conjectural. Williams' account of what constitutes valued knowledge is based partly on his attempt to re-define culture by a synthesis of previous definitions, and partly on his argument that knowledge is socially created. But, despite his own overt objections to a distinctive 'high' culture, it is evident that Williams himself is extending the selection of valued knowledge and activity, not avoiding selection. At the same time, he is preserving the distinction between skilled intellectual activities (associated with the ideal of 'high culture') and the more 'ordinary' activities of a culture. The thesis also questions Williams' proposition that knowledge is a social creation based ideally on a pooling of common experience. It argues that 'experience' is not invariably the sound basis for knowledge that Williams assumes it to be and it questions the need for his strong emphasis on commonly shared experience. A 'common culture' functioning both for the expression of, and as the necessary basis for an egalitarian society is the distinctive mark of Williams' ideal society, a society which he believes will nurture man's evolving potential and hence his cultural progress. The characteristics of that ideal society - communal solidarity, participating democracy, consensus by open communication, and the principal of 'equality of being' - are critically examined, and attention is drawn to some ambiguities and apparent contradictions in their exposition. Finally, the function Williams ascribes to education, namely, that of being an important means of developing man's individual and collective potential, is examined. Williams' concern for developing intellectual skills, and for directing these towards the changing of society, is contrasted with his tendency to subordinate education to stated social ends. This, it is argued, may lead in practice to less dynamic results and be more open to distortion than Williams obviously intends. In summary, it is maintained that Williams' arguments from experience form an inadequate base for the claims his theory of culture is called on to support; that his attempt to redefine culture by a synthesis of existing and to some degree conflicting definitions leaves unresolved a number of ambiguities and contradictions; and that these weaknesses are reflected in some of his prescriptions for education