Regulation of executive remuneration: an empirical study of the first three years of a 'disclosure and voting' regime in Australia and the UK

© 2010 Dr. Kym Maree SheehanLegislation by the UK government in 2002 and the Australian government in 2004 sought to improve board accountability for executive remuneration practices in listed companies. The thesis examines whether the remuneration report plus an advisory vote were effective in achieving this and other government policy aims (such as reducing excessive remuneration and aligning pay with performance). The thesis focuses upon the initial three years of this regime in the UK (2003-2005) and Australia (2005/06-2007/08). Part I of the thesis reviews three theories of motivation from the human resource management literature, together with two derivatives of agency theory (optimal contract and the managerial power thesis) to justify executive remuneration practices and the need for it to be regulated. Drawing upon the concept of ‘regulatory space’ and Julia Black's writings on rule dimension and regulatory conversation, the thesis presents a conceptual model of the regulatory framework for executive remuneration: the regulated remuneration cycle consisting of four activities (remuneration practice, disclosure, engagement and voting). Close analysis of the rule types, regulators and regulatees within this regulated remuneration cycle demonstrates that most of the rules found in the cycle take the form of statements of best practice, or other kinds of ‘soft law’, rather than legislation. Thus enforcement of good remuneration practices does not rely upon legal sanctions. The enforcement pyramid for remuneration practice confirms that most of the enforcement strategies for remuneration practice belong to shareholders. However, the regulated remuneration cycle exposes the three roles that shareholders play within this regulatory space: a rule-maker for executive remuneration practice, an active engager of remuneration committees and a routine voter on remuneration-related resolutions. Part II presents qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence of the operation of the remuneration report and advisory vote in both jurisdictions. It analyses remuneration reports and voting results for a sample of companies from the FTSE 100 and the S&P/ASX 200 for the first three years. It supplements this publicly available information with interview evidence from remuneration committees and their consultants, institutional investors and institutional representative organisations. By analysing the rules for each of the four activities in light of the evidence of how they work in practice, it demonstrates the challenges facing remuneration committees and institutional investors in working within the regulated remuneration cycle. Using the advisory vote as a proxy for shareholder outrage, it demonstrates the effect that the vote had on remuneration practice over the first three years of its operation was not identical in the UK and Australia. Part III concludes the thesis by presenting six findings on the operation of the regulatory initiatives of the remuneration report and advisory vote. These reforms were only partially successful in improving board accountability and unsuccessful in reducing excessive remuneration over the first three years of its operation. The implications of these findings for the regulatory reforms enacted in response to the global financial crisis are noted