Judicial review in Indonesia: between civil law and accountability?: a study of constitutional court decisions 2003-2005

© 2006 Dr. Simon Andrew ButtThis thesis assesses Indonesia's new Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK) through an analysis of the decisions it handed down in 2003-2005. Established in 2003, the MK has jurisdiction to resolve jurisdictional disputes between state institutions; to rule on disputed electoral returns and motions to impeach the President or VicePresident; and to review statutes. It is the first Indonesian court to have jurisdiction over these matters. In some of its decisions, the Court has exercised its judicial review powers vigorously. It has struck down unconstitutional statutes, discovered and enforced implied rights and government obligations, and assessed government policy. Its decision-writing style, however, reflects traditional French civil law influence, providing little transparency in its decision-making process. This raises questions about the level of accountability to which the Court exposes itself. Its accountability is brought further into question by some of its institutional characteristics, such as its lack of external supervision, the dearth of judicial training for its judges and the absence of performance-based career incentives. I show that the government is prepared to ignore, or circumvent, decisions of the Court. I argue that to command more respect, the Court could increase the transparency and accountability it provides, by writing decisions that are better reasoned. Alternatively or additionally, it could reduce its activism so as to reduce the level of accountability it should provide. The Court has already begun doing this - notably by declaring that its decisions operate only prospectively and by allowing unconstitutional statutes to stand in the 2005 and 2006 Budget cases. This thesis argues that, although these cases are a good start, the Court could further improve the level of accountability it provides. Unless the Court issues better reasoned decisions, or less political dramatic decisions, or both, the Indonesian government might not comply with the Court's decisions. The government might claim that it does not understand the Court's decisions or the rationale for them, or might be unwilling or unable to comply. Unless the Court succeeds in achieving compliance with its decisions, it may end up being counted in the long list of failed attempts at Indonesian judicial reform