The common consequence effect and preference reversals are two of the foundational violations of the standard model of rational choice (i.e. von Neumann – Morgenstern expected utility theory) and, as such, played an important role in the development of empirical behavioural economics. One can hypothesise, however, that due to varying degrees of risk aversion when faced with outcomes of different magnitude, the rate of both of these violations may vary with outcome size. Using various types of outcome, this article reports tests of these violations using different outcome magnitudes in within-respondent designs. The results observed are broadly consistent across outcome type: the common consequence effect, while rarely being substantially ob...
© 2020, Economic Science Association. We provide a novel but intuitive explanation for expected util...
The reasons for people making certain decisions has always been a question of interest among researc...
Recent research invokes preference imprecision to explain violations of individual decision theory. ...
Although there are alternative models which can explain the Allais paradox with non-standard prefere...
<p>The Allais Paradox is a well-known bias in which people's preferences result in contradictory cho...
The literature suggests that probability weighting and choice set dependence in- fluence risky choic...
The preference reversal phenomenon was believed to be inconsistent with the transitivity axiom of de...
We investigate the implications of Salience Theory for the classical preference reversal phenomenon,...
Research on preference reversals has demonstrated a disproportionate influence of outcome probabilit...
Preference reversals are frequently observed in the lab, but almost all designs use completely trans...
This short paper shows that the Allais Paradox and the Common Ratio Effect regarded as classic examp...
This paper tests Birnbaum’s (2004) theory that the constant consequence paradoxes of Allais are due ...
Influential economic approaches as random utility models assume a monotonic relation between choice ...
Theorems about the rational decision making play very important role in the decision theory. Accordi...
This paper sheds new light on the preference reversal phenomenon by analyzing decision times in the ...
© 2020, Economic Science Association. We provide a novel but intuitive explanation for expected util...
The reasons for people making certain decisions has always been a question of interest among researc...
Recent research invokes preference imprecision to explain violations of individual decision theory. ...
Although there are alternative models which can explain the Allais paradox with non-standard prefere...
<p>The Allais Paradox is a well-known bias in which people's preferences result in contradictory cho...
The literature suggests that probability weighting and choice set dependence in- fluence risky choic...
The preference reversal phenomenon was believed to be inconsistent with the transitivity axiom of de...
We investigate the implications of Salience Theory for the classical preference reversal phenomenon,...
Research on preference reversals has demonstrated a disproportionate influence of outcome probabilit...
Preference reversals are frequently observed in the lab, but almost all designs use completely trans...
This short paper shows that the Allais Paradox and the Common Ratio Effect regarded as classic examp...
This paper tests Birnbaum’s (2004) theory that the constant consequence paradoxes of Allais are due ...
Influential economic approaches as random utility models assume a monotonic relation between choice ...
Theorems about the rational decision making play very important role in the decision theory. Accordi...
This paper sheds new light on the preference reversal phenomenon by analyzing decision times in the ...
© 2020, Economic Science Association. We provide a novel but intuitive explanation for expected util...
The reasons for people making certain decisions has always been a question of interest among researc...
Recent research invokes preference imprecision to explain violations of individual decision theory. ...