Reason and religious belief in traditional epistemology, reformed epistemology and Wittgenstein: A critical comparative inquiry.

"In this thesis the author investigates the rationality of religious belief. In the first chapter he critically discusses the two main strands of classical epistemology (internalism and externalism), while focusing on the internalist view of foundationalism. Foundationalists maintain that certain propositions are basic in a rational belief system. These are rationally justified when apprehended, thus they serve as a foundation for knowledge. Formulating a criterion to determine what basic beliefs are has proven to be an insurmountable difficulty for foundationalism, however. The author argues that there is no rationale for strict criteria of basic beliefs. In the second chapter, he considers a group of philosophers (the reformed epistemologists) who recognize this problem of the criterion of foundational beliefs, yet still hold that it is correct to think that religious belief has foundations. They appeal to a descriptive sense of basicality, and not one that is supported by strict logical criteria. If one can see that a belief acts as a ground of his belief system in a moment when it is apprehended, the reformists argue, one can claim that it is de facto foundational. In the third chapter the author considers imcarmy similarities in investigative style between the reformed epistemologist and Ludwig Wittgenstein, though he eventually focuses upon two differentiating features. He argues that Wittgenstein is right to claim that basic beliefs ought not be a focus of rationality. Basic beliefs, like "God exists", are held in place by non-basic beliefs which determine what God's existence amounts to. Taken as it is, "God exists" expresses nothing. It is not a foundation for belief in God, but like an axis around which non-basic beliefs revolve. The second difficulty that the reformist faces, the author argues, is that if one need only describe how a belief acts as a foundation of knowledge in a particular circumstance, then it seems that nearly any belief could conceivably be a foundation of knowledge. One need only appeal to justifying circumstances in which a belief could be described as acting foundationally. Conversely, he shows that Wittgenstein can argue against this charge, but it stands in the way of fully accepting reformed epistemology as an epistemology of religious belief.