During the last years there has been a growing interest around this topic, mainly due to its impact in generating the Global Financial Crisis. The aim of the presente Dissertation is to determine which senior executive incentives have higher impact in the Banking Sector of the U.S.A., acknowledging the resources allocated by the banques to each type of remuneration, contextualizing them with regards to the total anual compensation plan for each CEO present in the sample. Seeking a practical approach, this thesis estimates the models that better fit the sample, provided its main characteristics. The results obtained point to interesting conclusions, which are representative of the north-american Banking Industry; using a sample of the 62 big...
In this Article, we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis wer...
We propose a simple measure of the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs of highly levered financial in...
Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentiv...
Bank executives’ compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis...
The thesis traces developments in executive compensation at a sample of American (US) and European b...
In the wake of the global financial crisis, attention has often focused on whether incentives genera...
This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO compensation i...
This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial bank...
This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including ...
Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentive...
The growth rate of chief executive officers\u27 (CEOs) compensation has dramatically outpaced averag...
This paper examines the effect of recent regulations on executive incentive compensation contracting...
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the viability of two basic theories of compensation ...
I examine two sets of incentives faced by corporate CEOs to determine how they respond to those inc...
The high pays received by executives has gained global attention. This study examines the impact of ...
In this Article, we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis wer...
We propose a simple measure of the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs of highly levered financial in...
Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentiv...
Bank executives’ compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis...
The thesis traces developments in executive compensation at a sample of American (US) and European b...
In the wake of the global financial crisis, attention has often focused on whether incentives genera...
This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO compensation i...
This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial bank...
This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including ...
Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentive...
The growth rate of chief executive officers\u27 (CEOs) compensation has dramatically outpaced averag...
This paper examines the effect of recent regulations on executive incentive compensation contracting...
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the viability of two basic theories of compensation ...
I examine two sets of incentives faced by corporate CEOs to determine how they respond to those inc...
The high pays received by executives has gained global attention. This study examines the impact of ...
In this Article, we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis wer...
We propose a simple measure of the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs of highly levered financial in...
Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentiv...