A game between two computers is considered: the first computer generates a binary sequence while the second one tries to predict the next element of this sequence using the previous elements. Both computers operate with the same pool of strategies, which is the set of all boolean functions of N arguments. Notwithstanding the asymmetry of the game, it turns out that the value of the game is zero. An algorithm for choosing an optimal superstrategy for the first computer is proposed, and several generalizations of the game are considered
Errors are common in strategic situations. We use a genetic algorithm to simulate the evolution of e...
The problem of computing optimal strategy to commit to in various games has attracted intense resear...
Il s'agit d'une resoumission selon les indications données par Franck Laloé.Research report.Games ha...
AbstractWe investigate the use of automata theory to model strategies for nonzero-sum two-person gam...
The problem of computing optimal strategy to commit to in various games has attracted intense resear...
We consider a class of infinite two-player games on finitely coloured graphs. Our main question is: ...
Games have been extensively studied, either in computer science, mathematics or even economy. Nevert...
The paper examines the asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs in a repeated game when...
In this thesis we focus on algorithms for searching for the best move in a given position in an abst...
Abstract. In game theory, deciding whether a designed player wins a game corresponds to check whethe...
We provide a self-contained introduction to finite extensive games with perfect information. In thes...
We study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays again...
In this article we present an overview on the state of the art in games solved in the domain of two-...
We study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing st...
International audienceWe examine the case of a two-person repeated game played by a boundedly ration...
Errors are common in strategic situations. We use a genetic algorithm to simulate the evolution of e...
The problem of computing optimal strategy to commit to in various games has attracted intense resear...
Il s'agit d'une resoumission selon les indications données par Franck Laloé.Research report.Games ha...
AbstractWe investigate the use of automata theory to model strategies for nonzero-sum two-person gam...
The problem of computing optimal strategy to commit to in various games has attracted intense resear...
We consider a class of infinite two-player games on finitely coloured graphs. Our main question is: ...
Games have been extensively studied, either in computer science, mathematics or even economy. Nevert...
The paper examines the asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs in a repeated game when...
In this thesis we focus on algorithms for searching for the best move in a given position in an abst...
Abstract. In game theory, deciding whether a designed player wins a game corresponds to check whethe...
We provide a self-contained introduction to finite extensive games with perfect information. In thes...
We study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays again...
In this article we present an overview on the state of the art in games solved in the domain of two-...
We study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing st...
International audienceWe examine the case of a two-person repeated game played by a boundedly ration...
Errors are common in strategic situations. We use a genetic algorithm to simulate the evolution of e...
The problem of computing optimal strategy to commit to in various games has attracted intense resear...
Il s'agit d'une resoumission selon les indications données par Franck Laloé.Research report.Games ha...