Enforcement in Germany - Foundations and Consequences of Adverse Disclosure

Since 2005, listed firms in Germany have been subject to the hybrid enforcement system that aims at ensuring consistent and faithful application of relevant accounting standards and in particular IFRS. Being first of its kind, the German enforcement system combines cooperative investigations conducted by a private financial reporting enforcement panel (FREP) and federal powers through downstream involvement of the German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). The hybrid enforcement system’s main deterrent is adverse disclosure which involves public dissemination of financial misreporting. In this dissertation, which comprises five separate manuscripts, I analyze both foundations and consequences of adverse disclosure in Germany. The first two manuscripts address different questions related to institutional premises and deduce avenues for future research. The remaining three manuscripts elaborate on selected research questions related to consequences of financial misreporting and their determinants. In summary, this dissertation has material impact on the understanding of hybrid enforcement systems.:I. ENFORCEMENT IN GERMANY: FOUNDATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ADVERSE DISCLOSURE 1 Introduction to the Research Context 2 Overview and Findings of the Manuscripts II. ENFORCEMENT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING: A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 1 Introduction 2 Theoretical Background 3 Identification and Description of Relevant Literature 4 Critical Discussion 5 Avenues for Further Research 6 Conclusion and Limitations III. DEUTSCHLAND UND ÖSTERREICH ALS BEISPIEL DER IMPLEMENTIERUNG HYBRIDER ENFORCEMENT-SYSTEME IN EUROPA 1 Einleitung und Problemstellung 2 Charakteristika hybrider Enforcement-Systeme 3 Unterschiede in der formalrechtlichen Gestaltung der Enforcement-Systeme in Deutschland und Österreich 4 Implikationen für die Klassifizierung hybrider Enforcement-Systeme und die Enforcement-Praxis 5 Zusammenfassung IV. DETERMINANTS OF INVESTOR REACTIONS TO ERROR ANNOUNCEMENTS: EXTENDED EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY 1 Introduction 2 The German Enforcement System 3 Previous Research and Hypotheses Development 4 Methodology 5 Results 6 Conclusion V. THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE TURNOVER AND FINANCIAL MISREPORTING: EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY 1 Introduction 2 Corporate Governance, Financial Misreporting, and Management Turnover 3 Hypothesis Development and Empirical Predictions 4 Methodology 5 Results 6 Conclusion VI. ENFORCEMENT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING IN PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL FIRMS: AN INTEGRATIVE CASE 1 Introduction 2 Student Material 3 Educators Materia