Parliamentary oversight of the security sector : the case of the South African National Defence Force

D.Litt. et Phil.Abstract: Soon after democracy, South Africa embarked on elaborate process to transform its defence force. This was intentional. During apartheid, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was entwined in the National Party’s politics, blurring the line between politics and the military. After 1994, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and Department of Defence were established, bringing much needed changes in this regard. The instituted changes were to occur within the bounds of what is now referred to as the Security Sector Reform (SSR) paradigm. Among an array of SSR measures initiated were enabling legal, electoral, institutional, operational and parliamentary mechanisms important for sound parliamentary oversight of the SANDF and defence expenditure. Lauded for their comprehensiveness, these transformatory mechanisms were later to shape the concept of SSR, and inspire similar reforms elsewhere. Two decades into democracy, it is reasonable to assume that sound parliamentary oversight of the SANDF and primarily, defence expenditure is profoundly embedded in South Africa. This study argues that the enabling mechanisms introduced as part of SSR have shown to be inadequate, defective and impaired. This is mainly attributable to the undermining of democracy as a derivative of politics. It has weakened parliamentary oversight of the SANDF, and particularly of defence expenditure, and impaired SSR. This means that if democracy is weakened, so, too, is SSR. Therefore, the quality, depth, form, substance and sustainability of SSR are entwined to the preservation of democracy, which is influenced by politics. More specifically, at the political level of SSR, the enabling legal mechanisms have proven not enough to ensure sound oversight. This is in part due to the confluence of the party and the state demonstrated by the strained relations between the three organs of state and the ambiguities of some laws. Discontent about the partisan Speaker of Parliament has similarly been raised. The current electoral system also fosters loyalty to the party instead of the electorates. The lacking institutional capacity of parliament is also indicative of patronage rooted in the flawed implementation of the cadre deployment policy, which values loyalty over merit. Matters are no different at the economic level of SSR. The enabling mechanisms have not led to full compliance with the law with minimal consequences for transgressors. Ambiguities in law are also a challenge. Repeated audit opinions reveal failures to adhere to legal prescripts with irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure all too common. Alongside these is declining..