Facio ut facias

This exploratory study takes a look at the puzzle of what type of contracts are suitable for governing innovation, with particular atte ntion to inter-firm networks. It employs a conceptual framework that integrates organizational theory of formal coordination with economic perspectives on contracting, and innovate previous analyses in two ways: developing an assessment of alternative contractual forms in terms of knowledge governance and not only in terms of conflict resolution; analyzing contracts according to the intensity at which they incorporate not only market-like mechanisms, but also hierarchical and bureaucratic mechanisms, and a usually neglected array of associational and democratic mechanisms, as related to the level of uncertainty and innovation. A new type of 'associational' and 'constitutional' contract, resource based rather than action-based, is singled out as particularly fit to the governance of innovation. The framework is empirically applied to content analyze the written agreements regulating inter firm alliances for innovation in a comparative case study approach