Imposing a separability assumption on the joint surplus in transferable utility matching models has proved very useful in empirical work. Yet when only “who matches whom” is observed, the distributions of unobserved heterogeneity cannot be identified separately. This note derives the distribution of equiilibrium transfers and shows that if the distribution of transfers within cells is observed, the distribution of heterogeneity can often be recovered, separability can be tested, and complementarities in surplus inferred
A model of the labor market under search frictions is developed, where participants are heterogeneou...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
Wemodel worker heterogeneity in the rents from being employed in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides mode...
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the characteris...
We review recent advances in the estimation of matching models under transferable utility, with spec...
This paper provides a unifying framework of one-to-one and many-to-one matching without transfers an...
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and sep...
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with p...
Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on ...
In this note, we address nonparametric identification of a collective model of household behavior in...
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and...
We propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator appl...
This note studies the empirical content of a simple marriage matching model with transferable utilit...
In a transferable utility context, Choo and Siow (2006) introduced a competitive model of the marria...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...
A model of the labor market under search frictions is developed, where participants are heterogeneou...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
Wemodel worker heterogeneity in the rents from being employed in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides mode...
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the characteris...
We review recent advances in the estimation of matching models under transferable utility, with spec...
This paper provides a unifying framework of one-to-one and many-to-one matching without transfers an...
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and sep...
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with p...
Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on ...
In this note, we address nonparametric identification of a collective model of household behavior in...
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and...
We propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator appl...
This note studies the empirical content of a simple marriage matching model with transferable utilit...
In a transferable utility context, Choo and Siow (2006) introduced a competitive model of the marria...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...
A model of the labor market under search frictions is developed, where participants are heterogeneou...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
Wemodel worker heterogeneity in the rents from being employed in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides mode...