This paper examines optimal decision making under three different organizational forms: committees, hierarchies, and polyarchies. Focus is on the trade-off between errors of rejecting good projects versus errors of accepting bad projects, and on the trade-off between gains from more extensive evaluations of projects versus costs of evaluation. The authors characterize the optimal sizes of these organizations (as well as the optimal level of consensus in committees), and then analyze how these optima change under different organizational environments. They also analyze the influence of organizational environment on the relative performance of these alternative organizational forms
We analyze the optimal decision-making hierarchy in an organization when decision-makers of limited ...
textabstractThis paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-making proces...
An organization must select among competing projects that differ in their payoff consequences for it...
This dangerous fallacy I shall now illumine: To committees, nothing alien is human. Ogden Nash Commi...
This paper presents some new perspectives on the structure and performance of alternative economic o...
We present a general framework to study the project selection problem in an organization of fallible...
In situations of imperfect testing and communication, as suggested by Sah and Stiglitz (AER, 1986), ...
This article examines the optimal organizational form of project evaluation under competition. The e...
Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25 (1), pp. 207-220. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-00...
Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 24 (3), 397-411. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-03...
This paper studies collective decision making in the context of a project selection model. We derive...
Koh (Soc Choice Welf 25:207–220, 2005) studied the project evaluation problem when decision-makers i...
Koh (Soc Choice Welf 25:207–220, 2005) studied the project evaluation problem when decision-makers i...
Koh (<a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-005-0055-1">Soc Choice Welf 25:207–220...
Starting from the premise that individuals within an organization are fallible, this paper advances ...
We analyze the optimal decision-making hierarchy in an organization when decision-makers of limited ...
textabstractThis paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-making proces...
An organization must select among competing projects that differ in their payoff consequences for it...
This dangerous fallacy I shall now illumine: To committees, nothing alien is human. Ogden Nash Commi...
This paper presents some new perspectives on the structure and performance of alternative economic o...
We present a general framework to study the project selection problem in an organization of fallible...
In situations of imperfect testing and communication, as suggested by Sah and Stiglitz (AER, 1986), ...
This article examines the optimal organizational form of project evaluation under competition. The e...
Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25 (1), pp. 207-220. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-00...
Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 24 (3), 397-411. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-03...
This paper studies collective decision making in the context of a project selection model. We derive...
Koh (Soc Choice Welf 25:207–220, 2005) studied the project evaluation problem when decision-makers i...
Koh (Soc Choice Welf 25:207–220, 2005) studied the project evaluation problem when decision-makers i...
Koh (<a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-005-0055-1">Soc Choice Welf 25:207–220...
Starting from the premise that individuals within an organization are fallible, this paper advances ...
We analyze the optimal decision-making hierarchy in an organization when decision-makers of limited ...
textabstractThis paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-making proces...
An organization must select among competing projects that differ in their payoff consequences for it...