In the past 15 years the alternating-bit protocol has been perhaps the most widely verified protocol, the benchmark of protocol verification techniques; is it really correct? We claim that the answer is negative. The problem is that existing concepts of correctness do not capture an important sense in which a protocol may be incorrect. Specifically, although protocol goals (e.g., delivering messages) may be attained eventually, the time periods to achieve these goals may increase indefinitely. A notion of correctness which allows one to consider both the probability of reaching a goal as well as the time or computational effort required to achieve the goal is required. We present a novel approach to protocol correctness which unifies functi...
International audienceSymbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, conside...
International audienceSymbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, conside...
Abstract. We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocol...
Safe and live protocols have been shown to exhibit timing errors. To avoid such errors, timing requi...
Some twentyfive years ago, the field of computer-communication system performance evaluation and the...
The famous alternating bit protocol is an algorithm for transmitting a sequence of data through a so...
We present a strategy for finding algebraic correctness proofs for communication systems. It is des...
In this paper we show how symbolic probabilistic analysis techniques for finite state systems can be...
We introduce abstraction in a probabilistic process algebra. The process algebra can be employed for...
We consider abstraction in probabilistic process algebra. The process algebra can be employed for sp...
Communication protocol design requires to consider protocol performance in early phases of the softw...
It is often considered that a protocol that has been verified for its dependability properties at th...
Computer-aided design tools for Markovian analysis and verification of digital circuits have gained ...
Symbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, considering computations that...
We present a correctness proof for Ben-Or's Randomized Consensus Algorithm for the case in whic...
International audienceSymbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, conside...
International audienceSymbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, conside...
Abstract. We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocol...
Safe and live protocols have been shown to exhibit timing errors. To avoid such errors, timing requi...
Some twentyfive years ago, the field of computer-communication system performance evaluation and the...
The famous alternating bit protocol is an algorithm for transmitting a sequence of data through a so...
We present a strategy for finding algebraic correctness proofs for communication systems. It is des...
In this paper we show how symbolic probabilistic analysis techniques for finite state systems can be...
We introduce abstraction in a probabilistic process algebra. The process algebra can be employed for...
We consider abstraction in probabilistic process algebra. The process algebra can be employed for sp...
Communication protocol design requires to consider protocol performance in early phases of the softw...
It is often considered that a protocol that has been verified for its dependability properties at th...
Computer-aided design tools for Markovian analysis and verification of digital circuits have gained ...
Symbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, considering computations that...
We present a correctness proof for Ben-Or's Randomized Consensus Algorithm for the case in whic...
International audienceSymbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, conside...
International audienceSymbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, conside...
Abstract. We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocol...