ROMAN MILITARY ARCHITECTURE IN ROMAN ARABIA: A TRANSITION IN DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

Steven SidebothamThroughout the later Roman Principate and early Dominate a massive wave of fort construction swept the provinces of the Eastern Roman Empire, including locations in modem day Palestine, Syria and, more importantly for our purposes, Roman Arabia. Despite the diversity in construction and location of these forts, the precise motive for their construction in Roman Arabia is unknown. It is plausible that a variety of social, economic and military factors influenced the upsurge of construction here. The foundation of this construction, I believe, is clearly rooted in the military pressure felt, presumed or actual, in the East during the third, fourth and fifth centuries CE. This paper will explain how these fortresses exhibit shifts in regional strategy throughout the centuries. This study will examine several fortresses including el-Lejjun, Udruh, Qasr el-Azraq, Deir El-Kahf, and Qasr el-Hallabat, which will demonstrate the phases of a regional strategy in Roman Arabia. This paper will demonstrate that the change in fort construction reflected changes in military strategy in the Roman East from roughly the time of the Severan Dynasty (193-235 CE) through the Heraclian Dynasty (610-711 CE). The period of the First Tetrarchy (293-305 CE) followed a time of crisis for the Roman Empire: politically, the third century saw the fall of the relatively stable Severan Dynasty, which had ruled, with a short interruption (the reign ofMacrinus 217-18 CE), from 193-235 CE. There followed a half-century of civil wars and fragmentation of the empire (briefly) before the restoration of stability during the First Tetrarchy. As we examine the fortresses noted in this paper, we must focus on the function of individual case studies of specific fortifications. These purposes are three-fold ascending in importance; first, the purpose for the construction of these forts and how any subsequent reconstructions may demonstrate a change in function. Second, how these forts interacted with others in the area, perhaps denoting a change in local tactics. Third and finally, how each fort was a piece of a larger puzzle that may exhibit Roman strategy throughout the entire region. This thesis has four main sections. The first is background information, which will follow this introduction. The second consists of case studies of fortresses built along or near the Strata Serviana. The third deals with legionary fortresses built along the Via Nova Traiana (figure 1). The final section is an analysis of the function of these fortresses as a whole, which demonstrates how Roman strategy shifted in the East from the Severan Dynasty to the Heraclian Dynasty. Many acclaimed scholars have studied the fortifications of the limes Arabicus ('limes' was Latin for 'frontier.' A limes was a zone on the frontier that included fortifications). However, for our purposes, those focusing in southern Roman Arabia are of greater importance. There is much debate among academics concerning the purpose of fortresses in Roman Arabia. Essentially, there are two distinctive schools of thought. The first concentrates on fortifications as a defense against external threats, both nomadic and sedentary. Historians like S.T. Parker identify with this position. The second focuses on the idea of fortifications as a means to quell internal dissent, which has support from historians such as D. Graf and B. Isaac. Both Graf and Isaac stress the lack of evidence concerning nomadic incursions and highlight literary evidence regarding internal dissonance. While both schools present strong arguments for their opinions, this paper suggests that neither school truly represents the purpose of these fo1iifications over the entirety of the Roman occupation of Roman Arabia. At the start of the Roman occupation in Arabia (Post-106CE), certainly, these fortresses dealt mainly with the internal dissent that came with initial 'Romanization.' However, this changed with the rise of brigand groups in the third century and the growing Persian threat to the East. This argument will be expanded in the analysis section of Chapter 4.Histor